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NOTES

A Winning Hand: A Proposal for an
International Regulatory Schema with
Respect
to the Growing Online
Gambling Dilemma in the United
States
ABSTRACT

While a multitude of Internet enterprises folded in the
1990s, online gambling websites not only have held strong, but
appearto be ready to increase the stakes. No business relating to
the Internet currently generates more revenue than online
gambling, and that trend does not look like it will change soon.
While many Americans desire to participate in this form of
cyber-gambling, the current legality of their ability to do so
remains vague. For the most part, an American's ability to
gamble currently resides under the purview of state law and a
hodgepodge of antiquated federal wire acts. The nature of the
Internet, however, mandates that any scheme, regulatory or
prohibitory, be constructed in the international arena. For
various reasons, there have been efforts by members of Congress
to create strong prohibitory legislation specifically targeting
Internet gambling. The Author analyzes not only whether a
domestic prohibitionschema is the best model to implement, but
also whether such a model could even be truly effective. The
Author further shows that an international regulatory model
can provide a legitimate method of control while allowing
individual countries to maintain discretion over the form of
online gambling they allow to their citizens. At the same time,
this internationalregulatory schema would still provide a valid
international enforcement net against offenders. Under this
regulatory schema, problem gamblers can be protected while
still preserving the opportunity for other patrons to get lucky
and hit it big.
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I. INTRODUCTION
No business on the Internet earns more revenue than online
gambling.' In 2002, two million players lost a collective $3.5 billion at
nearly 2,000 "virtual casino" websites. 2 In 2003, online gambling sites

1.
2.

John Horn et al., Pointand Bet, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 28, 2002, at 1.
Id.
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took in more than $4.1 billion dollars. 3 In 2004, it is projected that
revenues from online gambling activities could be $6 billion with
potentially 15 million players. 4 Some estimates suggest that gamblers
in the United States are responsible for sixty-five percent of this
amount. 5 In describing the scope of online gambling's potential
influence on the American populace, the Final Report issued by the
National Gambling Impact Study Commission stated that "[o]nline
wagering promises to revolutionize the way Americans gamble
because it opens up the possibility of immediate, individual, 24 hour
access to the full range of gambling in every home." 6
As the popularity of online gambling continues to swell, the
issues surrounding its legitimacy have yet to be resolved. It is too
simplistic to say that online gambling is or is not per se illegal in the
United States. For the most part, gambling legislation has largely
been a matter of state law. 7 Not surprisingly, state responses to
online gambling legislation have varied considerably, running from
prohibition to regulation to taxation. 8 Historically, the federal
response to the issue of online gambling has been to acquiesce to the
various approaches taken by the states. 9 Instead of enacting law
specifically targeting online gambling, Congress has consistently
relied on antiquated "wire acts" to maintain the choices that have
been made at the state level.iO
Controlling online gambling, however, is not an issue confined to
the United States. Online gambling can best be described as a global
issue that affects virtually all countries. While many Americans
participate in online gambling as users, almost all gambling websites
and virtual casinos are located offshore with their primary base of
operations in exotic locations such as Antigua (a Caribbean-island
country), Belize, and Curacao."i As will be discussed in this Note,

Gregory Manter, The Pending Determination of the Legality of Internet
3.
1 (2003), at
Gambling in the United States, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16,
www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2003dltr0016.html.
Id.; see Antonia Z. Cowan, The Global Gaming Village: Interstate and
4.
TransnationalGambling, 7 GAMING L. REV 251, 252 (2003)

Manter, supranote 3.
5.
Cowan, supra note 4.
6.
Bruce P. Keller, The Game's the Same: Why Gambling in Cyberspace
7.
Violates Federal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1576 (May 1999).
See id.
8.
Id. at 1577.
9.
Id. at 1580-81.
10.
Id. at 1570-71; see, e.g., Joseph M. Kelly, Internet Gambling Law, 26 WM.
11.
MITCHELL L. REV. 117, 156-63 (2000) (Although it is outside the scope of this Note,
there have been instances in which virtual gaming operations were run from within the
United States. These operations were normally prosecuted under state law and shut
down. Thus, online gambling operations learned quickly to set up their operations in
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these countries have created a safe-haven for online gambling
operations and have gone to great lengths to encourage such
business. 12 Thus, analysis of online gambling requires analysis from
this international, operational perspective as well.
The fact that online gaming operations are run outside of the
United States does not resolve whether it is legal for Americans to
gamble on these websites as users. 13 One line of thought is
exemplified by the Department of Justice (DOJ) when it claims that it
is illegal for American users to gamble in this fashion. 14 Specifically,
in August 2002, the DOJ informed the Nevada Gaming Control Board
that Internet gambling was prohibited under a series of federal
laws. 15 The DOJ made it clear that it considered online gambling to
have occurred in both the jurisdiction of the gambler and in the
jurisdiction of the gambling website's operations (essentially, where
the website's computer servers are physically located). 16 Thus, under
the DOJ's view, users in a U.S. state can be held liable for their
activities even if the virtual casino is located in a different country. 17
While the legality of online gambling in the United States
remains in a quagmire of confusion, the societal concerns from
unchecked online gambling cannot be ignored. A great deal of
literature discusses the maladies that can accompany gambling.
Gambling has been associated with practically every conceivable
domestic problem one can think of: divorce, bankruptcy, crime,
domestic violence, child neglect, addictive gambling, and alcohol and
drug offenses.' 8 While the purpose of this Note is not to analyze the
causation versus correlative aspects of gambling or to understand the
exact extent of social damage it can inflict, commentary stating that
"[t]he yearly cost to society (in, e.g., productivity reductions, spending
on social services, and creditor losses) is approximately $5 billion"
appears reasonable. 19

other countries even though the exact legal underpinnings preventing their operations
in the United States could likely be questioned. Kelly provides a detailed account of the
circumstances under which Minnesota, New York, Missouri, and Wisconsin
successfully litigated against these Internet gambling entities in the domestic
situation.).
12.
Keller, supra note 7, at 1571; Kelly, supranote 11, at 119.
13.
Manter, supra note 3, 10.
14.

Id.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Cathryn L.

Claussen

& Lori K. Miller, Online Sports Gambling -

Regulation or Prohibition?,11 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 99, 108 (2001).

19.

Id.
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In lieu of these policy concerns and the unremitting fact that
online gambling does not appear to be a fad, there is a pertinent need
for the United States to develop a comprehensive schema to deal with
the situation. As this Note will show, the most viable solution should
encourage regulation over prohibition. Further, for this regulatory
solution to be effective, its reach must encompass an international
coalition of countries. The end result would be an international
regulatory schema that preserves each country's individual right to
decide the specifics of its online gambling laws while still creating a
legitimate method of enforcement.
The background of this Note (part II) will discuss the current
state of online gambling in the United States. This background will
discuss the interplay of online gambling with federal regulation, state
regulation, and proposed federal regulation. The relationship with
online gambling and the credit card industry is also briefly discussed.
This relationship is significant because self-regulation of the credit
card industry is an important consideration when analyzing whether
prohibition or regulation of online gambling operations would be more
effective. Finally, the background also will highlight an example of
pertinent case law that has been adjudicated on the matter. The
analysis (part III) will present the particulars of the online gambling
issue, and the criteria involved in evaluating different solutions. Part
III of this Note will also specifically discuss the merits and drawbacks
of the two major solutions, regulation and prohibition. Part IV will
analyze the regulation and prohibition solutions in the context of
what other countries have done, specifically focusing on the
Australian model. Part V will then summarize the findings of the
analysis and propose the required elements for an effective
international regulatory schema for online gambling.

II.

BACKGROUND: THE CURRENT STATE OF ONLINE GAMBLING IN THE
UNITED STATES

A. Online Gaming and State Law
Historically, regulation of gambling has been a matter reserved
for state legislation under the Tenth Amendment.2 0 All states have
some type of constitutional provision or statutory law that either (1)
prohibits gambling, (2) places limitations on the type of gambling
allowed, or (3) authorizes particular state-sponsored or licensed

20.

Cowan, supra note 4, at 255.
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gambling.2 1 While every state has made private lotteries unlawful,
state-run lotteries have become commonplace. At last count, these
state sponsored, revenue-generating enterprises are currently
operating in thirty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and the
United States territories of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the
North Mariana Islands. 22 Further, casino gambling in either
conventional commercial casinos or Indian casinos is allowed in
23
twenty-nine states.
Nevertheless, the states have had drastically different reactions
to the perceived threats of online gambling. 24 Certain states have
clearly prohibited online gaming. This is most easily seen in states
such as Utah and Hawaii, where gambling in any form is
prohibited. 25 Hawaii, for example, adamantly supports prohibition of
online gaming activities from both the operational and user
perspectives. 26 With respect to the user-perspective, a recent bill in
the Hawaiian legislature urged "Congress to enact legislation which
[would] ban United States citizens and resident aliens from engaging
in gambling activity of .any kind with any Internet or world-wide
gambling, gaming, or wagering establishment, and from placing
wagers with any world-wide web page or site that offers gambling
27
opportunities."
Nevada was the first state to develop a schema that
distinguished conventional, land-based gambling from online
gambling. In 1997, Nevada passed legislation specifically prohibiting
Internet gambling by its residents while still permitting land-based
casinos to operate. 28 Specifically, Nevada criminalized the conduct of
both a user who made an Internet bet and an operator who accepted a
wager from a person within Nevada. 29 The Nevada statute also
contained a rather: large exception stating that the law was
inapplicable in cases where the bet was "transmitted to a licensed
person or establishment in Nevada," thus undermining the strength

21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Keller, supra note 7, at 1576.
25.
Cara Franklin, Virtual Las Vegas: Regulate or Prohibit?, 2001 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 21,
7 (2001), available at www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/
2001d1tr0021.html.
26.
Kelly, supra note 11, at 154.
27.
Id.; see also H.R. Con. Res. 150, 19th Leg. (Haw. 1998).
28.
Jenna F. Karadbil, Casinos of the Next Millennium: A Look into the
ProposedBan on Internet Gambling, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 413, 419 (2000).
29.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 465.091-.094 (Michie 2001); Kelly, supra note 11, at
154.
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of the legislation. 30 In response to the softening hearts of the Nevada
legislature toward the viability of an effective online gambling
schema, the Nevada Gaming Commission was given power under a
key piece of 2001 Nevada legislation to begin creating regulations and
a licensing structure for casino operators who wished to operate
online gambling ventures. 3 1 This was a significant departure from the
conventional attitude of the states.
While Nevada went from one extreme to the other, other states
have gradually passed legislation prohibiting online gambling-at least
at some level. Other examples include Illinois and Louisiana passing
laws specifically prohibiting Internet gambling operations. 32 Louisiana
"made gambling by computer a misdemeanor punishable by a $500 fine
and/or six months in jail. '33 Specifically, under the Louisiana statute,
"[a]n operator or designer of Internet gambling is subject to a $20,000
fine and/or a five-year prison sentence. '34 Illinois law also criminalizes
the conduct of the operator of the Internet gambling site in addition to
the user who uses the Internet for gambling. 35 The Illinois legislation
has become, however, "the subject of ridicule" with the local media
essentially because of the inherent and troubling problem of enforcing
any type of prohibition scheme when the online gambling activity
occurs in private. 36 "The Chicago Sun Times succinctly concluded that
the Illinois law 'has bark and no bite' and that without cyber cops
monitoring households and their computers, the law will be difficult to
enforce. '37 While the Sun-Times' comments appear particularly acidic
in tone, the criticism seems to have merit-how can an online gambling
prohibition be enforced (especially against a user) while still respecting
38
some semblance of privacy?
In summary, even though the exact differences among the
various state laws with respect to online gambling are beyond the
scope of this Note and irrelevant to the issues discussed, it is
important to realize that these differences exist. As will be seen in
this Note, analyzing the way multiple states or territories deal with
the online gambling situation in concert gives insight into the

30.
Craig Lang, Internet Gambling: Nevada Logs In, 22 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
525, 543 (2002) (discussing Nevada's position as a leader in the gambling industry as a
basis for the State's new stance).
31.
Id.; see also NEV. REV. STAT. 463.
32.
Kelly, supra note 11, at 154; see also 1999 Ill.
Laws 257; LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:90.3 (West 1998).
33.
Kelly, supra note 11, at 154-55.
34.
Id. at 155.
35.
Id.; see 1999 Ill. Laws 257.
36.
Kelly, supra note 11, at 155.
37.
Id.
38.
See generally id.
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viability of an international regulatory schema that involves various
countries with different agendas. In addition, it is important to note
that while the different states have varied policies, the general
position among the states appears to favor prohibition, instead of
regulation, of online gambling activities.

B. Online Gaming and Federal Statutes
Although there is currently no specific federal regulation
regarding online gambling, there are a number of regulations that
arguably operate to regulate and prohibit it. The DOJ maintains that
Internet gambling is illegal under "at least four federal statutes." 39
The Wire Act of 1961 is the principal law that governs interstate
gambling. 40 "The Wire Act makes it illegal for gambling providers to
offer or to take bets from gamblers over telephone lines or through
other wire devices unless the specific act is authorized by a particular
state." 41 Because the Wire Act was originally enacted in 1961, it is
not surprising that it does not specifically mention the Internet or
other existing technologies like satellite-based transmission. 42 The
Wire Act's terminology of "through other wire devices," however,
arguably does give the DOJ "the leeway to prosecute interstate and
'43
international gambling transactions executed over the Internet.
The DOJ further maintains that the Wire Act covers not only the
taking and placing of bets on the Internet, but also embraces any
knowing "use" of the Internet in connection with a gambling
business. 44 Subsequently, the DOJ contends that the law prohibits
*'not only the act of gambling, but also the transmissions of any
information that make it possible to bet in the first place. '45 Gaming
industry leaders contend that the DOJ places too much emphasis on
the Wire Act in the context of online gambling prohibition. 46 They
argue that the legislative history surrounding the Wire Act makes it
clear that the purpose of the legislation was to crack down on illegal
sports betting; consequently, it remains silent on other gambling
activities. 4 7 Further, the industry leaders advocate that "if Congress

39.
Karadbil, supra note 28, at 426; see also Transmission of Wagering
Information, 18 U.S.C § 1084 (1998); Lottery Statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1301-04 (1999);
Illegal Gambling Business, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1998); RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-63 (1999).
40.
Karadbil, supra note 28, at 426.
41.
Id. at 426-27; see also Transmission of Wagering Information § 1084.
42.

Id. at 427.

43.
44.

Franklin, supra note 25, 9.
Keller, supra note 7, at 1581.

45.

Id.

46.

Manter, supra note 3,

47.

Id.

11.
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has changed its policy toward telephone and Internet gambling over
the last forty years, it must make its intentions clear in the form of
'4 8
new legislation.
While the Wire Act is the piece of legislation most often used to
prosecute illegal online gambling, the 1961 Travel Act (18 U.S.C. §
1952) and the 1970 Illegal Gambling Business Act (18 U.S.C. § 1955)
were passed with the legislative intent that both laws be applied
extraterritorially, signifying the possible application of either
legislation in place of the over-extended Wire Act. 49 The Travel Act
prohibits interstate or foreign travel or use of an interstate facility in
furtherance of an unlawful business enterprise. 50 Under the 1970
Illegal Gambling Business Act, a conviction requires showing that
"there is a gambling operation which, in either interstate or foreign
commerce, (1) is in violation of state or local law; (2) involves five or
more persons that either conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct
or own all or part of the business; and (3) remains in substantially
continuous operation for thirty days or has gross revenue of $2,000 in
any given day."S Nevertheless, while these statutes arguably do have
a further jurisdictional reach than the Wire Act, these statutes are
rarely used to prosecute online gambling activities because of their
tenuous relations to the process by which electronic gambling
52
fundamentally occurs.
C. Online Gaming and Proposed Legislation
The concern over the questionable effectiveness of the Wire Act
as a prohibition to online gambling has resulted in newly proposed
federal regulations. 53 In 1995, responding to this concern, Senator
John Kyl introduced the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act (IGPA)

48.
Id.
49.
Cowan, supra note 4, at 257 (demonstrating the extended reach of the
statutes by the use of broad prohibiting words in each statute and the inclusion of
phrases such as "interstate or foreign commerce").
50.
Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1961).
51.
Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1855 (1970).
52.
But see Franklin, supra note 25,
11 (stating that "[f]or now, online
gambling is still, technically, illegal in the United States under the Wire Act, but this
foundation is shaky at best, and definitely does not eradicate online gambling, or even
come close to putting a dent in it"). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1855 (1970) (Likewise, the
Wire Act is more immediately applicable to online gambling operations than the Illegal
Gambling Act, which defers to state law in its criteria for violations.); 18 U.S.C. § 1952
(1961) (The Travel Act rarely is as useful as the Wire Act in the context of online
gambling because electronic transfer of data is not sufficient to count as "travel" under
the Travel Act.).
53.
Franklin, supra note 25, 10.
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specifically to prohibit online gambling.5 4 In committee, this bill
died. 55 In the years following, bills mirroring the IGPA were
introduced in both the House and the Senate. While these bills
earned recognition and support, a new law never resulted.5 6 For
instance, in 1997, Senator Kyl reintroduced a new IGPA, which the
57
Senate approved by a vote of ninety to ten on July 28, 1998.
58
Nevertheless, the House did not pass that version of the IGPA.
While the 1997 IGPA did not pass, it is significant to note that the
focus of the legislation was to update the Wire Act so that it included
broader terms more clearly and precisely banning Internet
gambling.5 9
On March 23, 1999, Senator Kyl reintroduced his bill, but this
version was less ambitious in its scope than previous versions.6 0 The
1999 IGPA did not attempt to criminally punish the individual bettor;
61
rather, it focused on the operational side of Internet gambling.
Specifically, the IGPA amended "the Federal Criminal Code to make
it unlawful for any person engaged in a gambling business to use the
Internet to place, receive, or otherwise make a bet or wager; or to
send, receive, or invite information assisting in the place of a bet or
wager."6 2 Further, the 1999 IGPA did not attempt to amend the Wire
Act, but rather it intended to introduce a new section, 1085, to Title
18 of the United States Code. 63 Aside from retracting criminal
penalties for individual bettors, the new version also did not attempt
to give the United States worldwide jurisdiction over Internet
gaming.6 4 Similar to the 1997 bill, the Senate approved the
legislation (this time unanimously), but it never was approved by the
House. 65 The IGPA was later killed by a joint congressional budget
committee, and there is no indication that its fate would be different
if it were to resurface. 6 6 The resistance to passing prohibition
legislation signals, perhaps, the opinion of members of the House that

54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
Karadbil, supra note 28, at 427.
57.
58.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 427.
59.
60.
Id. at 430.
61.
Id.
Id.; see Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999, S. 692, 106 Cong. § 2(b)
62.
(1999) (the bill that was not enacted); see also Kelly, supra note 11, at 145.
63.
Kelly, supranote 11, at 135-37.
64.
Id.
Thomas J. Friedrich, Internet Casino Gambling: The Nightmare of
65.

Lawmaking, Jurisdiction, Enforcement & Dangers of Prohibition, 11 COMMON L.
CONSPECTUs 369, 379 (2003); Karadbil, supra note 28, at 431.
66.
Friedrich, supra note 65, at 379.
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regulation, rather than prohibition, is a schema that can be more
effective and ultimately offer greater reward.
The DOJ also expressed concern over the need and viability of
the IGPA. The DOJ, basing its position on federal law such as the
Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act,
maintained that online gambling was already illegal. 6 7 The DOJ had
further problems with respect to IGPA's position in the international
context. Specifically, a provision in the updated IGPA stating that
"the Congress [and] the Executive Branch should commence
negotiations with foreign countries in order to conclude international
agreements that would strengthen the ability of the United States to
enforce the proposed legislation" was censured by the DOJ and
ultimately removed by Senator Kyl. 68 The DOJ explained its
reasoning for wanting the comment removed:
In our view, redirecting that effort, even in part, to focus on Internet
gaming would be a mistake. We should also note that, to the extent
individuals and organizations, whether here or abroad, violate U.S.
law; existing legal mechanisms can be used to enforce it. Although we
recognize that there may be times when we cannot obtain foreign
assistance, the fact remains that some form of gambling is legal in
virtually every state in the United States. This diminishes our ability to
persuade a foreign country that gambling must be vigorously combated,
69
absent extenuating circumstances.

Essentially, the DOJ felt that U.S. federal law intending to prohibit
online gambling could not be supported in an international coalition.
It is uncertain what the DOJ's position would be about the viability of
an international regulatory schema instead.
In 2002, another provision, the Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act (IGEA) was passed in the House of Representatives, finally
ending the streak of failed attempts at passing some type of online
gambling legislation in the House. 70 The bill, sponsored by Reps. Jim
Leach and John DeFalce is designed to limit U.S. access to Internet
gambling sites hosted on offshore servers. 7 1 The bill aims to
accomplish this goal by prohibiting Internet gambling businesses
from accepting credit, electronic funds transfers, checks, or drafts
from U.S. Internet gamblers. 72 The bill also holds financial
institutions responsible that knowingly act as intermediate agents

67.
See Cowan, supra note 4, at 257.
68.
Kelly, supra note 11, at 141.
69.
Id.
70.
Manter, supra note 3, 4; see also H.R. 556, 107th Cong. (2002); Friedrich,
supra note 65, at 375 (discussing House Resolution 556 under its alternative title, the
Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act (UIGFPA)).
71.
Manter, supra note 3, 4.
72.
Id.
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between the Internet gaming business and gamblers. 73 Commentary,
however, suggests that the IGEA may lack requisite substance. In his
Note, Thomas Friedrich, for example, states that the IGEA "all but
contradicts itself by effectively authorizing states to allow such
gaming activity because prohibited activity does not include 'any
lawful transaction with a business licensed or authorized74 by a State'
but at the same time, it specifically bans bets or wagers."
The resolution's future is unclear at this point. 75 In 2002, the
White House urged then Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle to
schedule a vote on this bill, arguing "the illegal Internet gambling
industry must be stopped. ' 76 In a letter in 2002, White House
economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey wrote that "Internet gambling
serves as a haven for money laundering and organized crime and,
potentially, for international terrorism." 77 Because of the constant
state of inaction in the Senate regarding the Act, which has continued
into the current term, "Congressional sources have said that the
enactment of legislation under those circumstances would be unlikely
''
until late 2004 or 2005. 78
Considering the progression of the IGPA and IGEA, it appears
that the federal interest in online gambling is driving toward bottlenecking online gambling operations. This is significant because
proponents of regulatory or prohibitive schemas in the United States
will have to note strategically that schemas built on user-based
perspectives have a much higher chance of facing legislative
stagnation. In addition, the legislative stagnation over the IGPA
strikes at the very heart of the difficulties concerning online gaming
law-whether it is in the best interest of the United States to
regulate or prohibit this activity. 79 One commentator has suggested
that the lackluster, head-nod-only appeal of the IGPA was due in part
to Congress' mixed feelings about the effectiveness of an outright ban
of online gambling versus more reserved measures such as increased
80
regulation or licensing.

Id.
73.
74.
Friedrich, supra note 65, at 375.
75.
Id. at 370.
Rod Smith, White House Presses Web Gaming Ban, REVIEW JOURNAL. COM,
76.
1 (Oct. 31, 2002), available at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrjhome/2002/Oct-31Thu-2002/news/19963771.html.
Id. 2.
77.
78.
Id. 10.
79.
See generally id.
Id. 20.
80.
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D. Online Gaming and the Credit Card Industry
Because the IGEA targeted financial institutions that served as
intermediaries in online gambling transactions, the credit card
industry has begun to self-regulate with regard to the role it chooses
to play in online gambling. 81 Many of the financial institutions
targeted in the IGEA have taken independent steps to prohibit
82
transactions between gamblers and Internet gambling businesses.
American Express, Discover, Citibank, MasterCard, and Visa prohibit
Internet gambling transactions because of the uncertain legal climate
of the industry. 83 In addition to increased liability, credit transaction
companies are concerned about increased risks of fraud and default
on payment, which they believe are higher in the area of online
84
gambling than in other transactions.
Alternatively, online gamblers regularly make payments through
digital money services such as PayPal, a business that primarily
facilitates online money transfers between members via e-mail. 85
PayPal, partially in response to its acquisition by E-Bay, declared
that it has agreed to prohibit all gambling transactions that it had
domain over. 86 Nevertheless, while PayPal is the largest name in the
online money transfer business, it still represents just one example of
these digital money transfer businesses. 8 7 Other online money
services similar to PayPal have rushed to fill the demand, and a
problem remains on this front.88 A likely result, if the IGEA becomes
law, is a system of online payment transfers where the payment
recipients are not recognized.8 9 One author has speculated that "[t]his
scenario could create a blind e-commerce that could not be regulated
and could exacerbate concerns about money laundering." 90

81.
Manter, supra note 3, 4; Linda Punch, (USA) Are All Bets Off for Online
Gambling?, 15 CREDIT CARD MGMT., MERCHANT ACQUIRING, No. 6, Sept. 2, 2002, at 14.
82.
Punch, supra note 81, at 14.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Manter, supra note 3, 9.
86.
Id.
87.
Friedrich, supra note 65, at 376.
88.
See id. (discussing the problem remaining with these online payment
sources); see also Manter, supra note 3, 9.
89.
Friedrich, supranote 65, at 376.
90.
Id.
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E. Relevant U.S. Case Law
The small amount of federal case law addressing online
gambling is not sufficient to form a comprehensive pattern. At this
91
time, the most significant federal case is United States v. Cohen.
The Second Circuit took a strong stand against Internet gambling
from both the operation and user viewpoint. 92 In Cohen, Jay Cohen, a
bookmaker, moved to the Caribbean island of Antigua to establish
World Sports Exchange (WSE), a sports-betting company that
specifically targeted customers in the United States through
advertisements in newspapers and on television and radio. 93 The
success of Cohen's venture was impressive: taking in $5.3 million in
wired U.S. funds during a fifteen-month period. 94 The FBI
investigated Cohen and his operation by placing bets of its own on
WSE via the telephone and the Internet from October 1997 to March
1998. 95 In March 1998, Cohen was arrested under the Wire Act of
1961.96 Cohen was convicted in February 2000 for violation of three
prohibition clauses in §1084(a) of the Wire Act: (1) transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce of bets and wagers, (2) transmission of
a wire communication that entitles the recipient to receive money or
credit as a result of bets or wagers, and (3) information assisting in
97
the placement of bets and wagers.
Cohen appealed his decision to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals arguing that the jury was improperly instructed to disregard
98
certain safe-harbor provisions set forth in § 1084(b) of the Wire Act.
The Second Circuit disagreed, finding that the safe harbor provisions
set forth in § 1084(b) were not applicable because they required that
the betting be legal in both the origin and the destination of the
transmission, which was not the situation in the case in chief.99
Cohen argued that his system was designed so that the "transmission
between WSE and its customers contained only information that
enabled WSE itself to place bets entirely from customer accounts
located in Antigua" and, therefore, was not a true transmission under
the Act as no act was illegally occurring domestically.10 0 The Court,

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001).
Manter, supra note 3, 12.
260 F.3d at 70.
Id.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id.
Manter, supra note 3, 13.
Id.
Id.
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however, held that a transmission between a bettor and WSE over
the telephone or Internet to signal the placement of a bet constituted
a transmission under §1084, and therefore an illegal transaction
"event" occurred at both the user end and the operation end.' 0 ' What
is significant about this case is that the Second Circuit held that
WSE's customers were placing bets by making those requests and
having them accepted even if the servers were located in foreign
territory.' 0 2 As one author has stated, "the [Cohen] decision sends a
strong message to the Internet gambling industry: when determining
whether a gambling transmission took place, the Second Circuit will
pierce through the mechanical means of placing bets to prevent the
safe-harbor for assisting information from applying."'10 3 As stated,
however, other circuits have not taken such aggressive positions.

III. ANALYSIS
A. The Need for Movement and a Solution
Online gambling currently resides in a state of legal purgatory.
There have been pushes from all three branches of the U.S.
government to prohibit or regulate both the operation and scope of
virtual gambling. The inconsistency of varying state regulations
indicates three concerns that need to be addressed. The fundamental
concern is that different states have opposite philosophical views on
the issue. Second, the varied state approach makes any prohibitive
scheme pragmatically impossible unless all states are to prohibit.
Third, the nature of the Internet with respect to online gambling
greatly exacerbates regional differences in regulation. Looking to the
federal government for a solution to this issue, at least in a domestic
vacuum, seems unappealing as well. Aside from the federal
government's ambivalence about what philosophy to take, its ability
to regulate or prohibit appears questionable until new legislation is
passed. The lack of a comprehensive federal common law on the
matter only adds to the difficulty in reaching a solution.
The first identifiable line of inquiry into online gambling is
whether regulation or prohibition, in the abstract, would be a more
viable policy option to take. In addition, like other issues involving
the Internet, online
gambling-by
its very
structure-is
transnational in nature. While there is little commentary specifically

101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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articulating this point, this observation would seem obvious. Online
gambling transactions overcome state or national boundaries (and
laws) with the ease of clicking a mouse. Thus, the virtues of any
regulatory or prohibitive schemas must be analyzed from an
international perspective that explores how effective solutions would
work in a global context. This concern cannot be overstated. If the
issue of online gambling is to be resolved, any solution must consider
how that implementation works with within the context of an
international coalition. Therefore, analysis is conducted under the
framework of an international perspective looking at how the
European Union, Australia, and various other countries have dealt
with the matter. Finally, the virtues of a regulatory international
schema will be discussed.
B. Criteriaand Policy Implications of a Solution (Factorsand
Guidelines)
The debate on whether to prohibit online gambling or merely
regulate it sparks a myriad of policy positions about the societal ills
that this form of gambling creates.10 4 The range of policy concerns is
endless and touches almost all areas of society. Opponents of online
gambling consistently expound on the "four evils" of Internet
gambling: (1) access to online gambling by minors, (2) potential for
05
fraud, (3) gambling addiction, and (4) tax preservation.1
Those who seek to prohibit online gambling often cite the
potential abuse by minors that online gambling creates.10 6 At a basic
level, these proponents of prohibition have a valid argumentwithout regulation and institutional safeguards on online gambling,
minors are able to gamble online because Internet operators cannot
verify the age of their users effectively. 10 7 Congressman Jim Leach
has echoed this belief, stating that children are extremely vulnerable
to falling prey to Internet gambling and that precautions must be
taken.108
Second, proponents of prohibition point out that Internet gaming
establishments do not have the same consumer protection
mechanisms in place as their land-based counterparts, a critique that
was pointed out in the Senate Committee Report on the IGPA. 10 9 The

104.
Friedrich, supra note 65, at 370.
105.
Theresa E. Loscalzo & Stephen J. Shapiro, Symposium, Internet Gambling
Policy: ProhibitionVersus Regulation, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 13 (2000).
106.
Friedrich, supra note 65, at 386.
107.
Loscalzo & Shapiro, supranote 105, at 14.
108.
Friedrich, supra note 65, at 382-83.
109.
Loscalzo & Shapiro, supranote 105, at 14-15.
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argument essentially is that the online gamblers cannot be certain
that virtual casinos operate their games fairly; in other words,
whether the underlying online computer programming creates a fair
110
It is
simulation and operates under a fair winning percentage.
clear that absent the kind of regulations that are imposed on landbased casinos in the United States, there is the potential for abuse by
online casinos. 1 1 '
An additional fear that was expressed in the Senate Committee
Report on the IGPA was that the continuous nature of online casinos
could lead to an increase in pathological gambling. 1 12 Furthering this
problem is the detached nature of online gambling, which can
exacerbate the risk of addiction. 1 13 Simply stated, between electronic
fund deposits and video wagering, an online gambler never comes
into physical contact with the funds being gambled. 114 Such a system
can lead some to gamble beyond their means. 115
Finally, some proponents for prohibition of online gambling may
be acting on behalf of additional interests that are not as altruistic as
those who voice "problem gambling" concerns. Though proponents of
prohibition may not publicly admit it as a concern, online gambling
undisputedly reduces state tax revenues. 116 States that have
legalized conventional gambling casinos collect significant taxes from
these operations." 7 Because online gambling websites allow gamblers
to patronize gambling establishments that are not licensed by any
state, states cannot obtain tax revenues from online casinos that are
either unlicensed or licensed by other jurisdictions. 118 To the extent
that gamblers reduce their patronage of state-licensed gaming
establishments in favor of wagering via online casinos, these states
suffer a significant decline in tax revenues. 119 Thus, the prohibition
argument may carry an economic agenda.
C. Regulation Versus Prohibition
As the background section has outline above, U.S. legislation in
favor of an absolute prohibition of online gambling has met with

Id.
110.
111.
Id.
Loscalzo & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 14-15; see also Lang, supra note 30,
112.
at 550 (discussing the concerns over gambling addiction in greater detail).
Lang, supra note 30, at 550.
113.
Id.
114.
115.
Id.
Loscalzo & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 15.
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
118.
119.
Id.
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resistance. The prohibition of online gambling, whether it comes in
the form of federal or state legislation, has problems when
implemented. First, an absolute ban on online gambling by U.S. users
contradicts the concept of capitalistic free exchange and forecloses one
of only two online business activities that produce profits on a yearly
basis. 120 An economically better solution would be a regulatorylicensing scheme. 121 If online casinos are forced to comply with strict
licensing requirements, it would not only help to legitimize the
virtual casinos that are "playing by the rules," but the licensing fees
could also help pay for the monitoring and auditing of all Internet
gambling sites to ensure that they are complying with the
regulations. 122 Also, operators are likely to act more reputably if they
are subject to licensing regulations that include requirements such as
the payment of operating fees and personal and credit investigations
23
for operators.
Besides leading to losses in tax revenue, prohibition does little to
solve the many policy-based concerns with online gambling
activity. 124 For example, simple prohibition by the United States
simply cannot extend far enough to truly safeguard gambling addicts
and minors. 125 Although domestic regulations could arguably
discourage U.S. operators from running online casinos based in the
United States, U.S. prohibitions would have no effect on offshore
Internet casino enterprises that are owned and operated by non-U.S.
citizens. 126 More specifically, to the extent that minors and addicts
are able to deposit funds with foreign Internet casinos, the IGPA and
additional U.S. legislation will not eradicate the problem of illegal
gambling on the Internet. Even if the federal or state regulations
prevent U.S. users from gambling in online casinos, U.S. bettors could
easily mask their location by dialing to an offshore Internet service
provider before logging into a virtual casino. 12 7 By doing this, it would
appear to the virtual casino operator and regulatory agencies that the
gambler is accessing the Internet from a jurisdiction where Internet

120.
Lang, supra note 30, at 539; see Horn, supra note 1 (the adult
entertainment industry is the only other business on the Internet that regularly turns
a profit).
121.
See Karadbil, supra note 28, at 435 (describing the effectiveness of
regulatory licensing in Belize).
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
Loscalzo & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 19-20.
125.
Id. at 20.
126.
Id. at 19.
127.
Lang, supranote 30, at 541-42.
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gambling is legal. 128 Thus, effective
prohibition laws is unrealistic.
While the argument above
prohibition is ineffective, Theresa E.
go a step further, contending that
would actually aggravate the policy
the United States. 129 Their views
passage:
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enforcement of federal (or state)
leads to the conclusion that
Loscalzo and Stephen J. Shapiro
a sole U.S. prohibition schema
problems of online gambling in
are reflected in the following

[D]omestic laws that prohibit Internet gambling may discourage
respected U.S. casino operators from entering the online casino market.
These respected operators, if permitted to open gaming sites on the
Internet, would have an incentive to implement security measures to
assure [sic] that minors do not access their sites. Namely, these
respected companies would be unwilling to jeopardize their land-based
operating licenses by allowing underage gambling on their Internet
sites. In the absence of respected U.S. casino operators or otherwise
appropriately licensed and regulated casinos from the online gaming
market, unlicensed, unregulated online operators will see the
opportunity for greater profits in the face of diminished competition
from established operators. This may encourage unknown or "fly by
night" operators who will be less likely to take action to reduce
underage gambling on their Web sites to enter the market. U.S.
prohibitions on Internet gambling, therefore, are unlikely to eliminate
0
or even reduce underage gambling and may exacerbate the problem.13

A better solution to prohibition is the development of a regulatory
schema. The effectiveness of this regulatory model depends on a
comprehensive international agreement involving multiple countries.
A schema of international scope is the only viable way to prevent
online gambling establishments from simply relocating their company
131
servers to countries where they cannot be regulated as easily.

128. Id.
129.
Loscalzo & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 19.
Id.; see also Karadbil, supra note 28, at 431. Karadbil shares the viewpoint
130.
that prohibition can actually make the situation worse. She notes,
A complete prohibition drives out those who would comply with regulatory
burdens. Thus, only those who are 'already predisposed to breaking the law'
The
will run Internet gambling operations outside of the United States .....
IGPA, in practice, would have little effect other 'than to scare away scrupulous
operators, leaving behind only those that are willing to break the law to satisfy
a very real consumer demand.
131.
Keller, supra note 7, at 1571. One Internet gambling operator has stated
the ease of creating and operating a virtual casino:
All wagers take place in Antigua on our server. No money is transferred on a
bet by bet basis. People must open accounts and wager from their accounts.
When players bet they are directing a foreign transaction, no different than
moving money from one offshore business to another ..... The bet takes place

1408

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 37'1389

Thus, any regulatory model must have sufficient international
cooperation to handle the complexity of these online casinos.
A basic regulatory model can allow for gambling while
addressing potential complications. First, many of the societal
concerns revolving around online gambling can be managed by a
strong regulatory system. While it is true that online gambling may
facilitate the troubling habits of gambling addicts, it is also true that
specialized technology such as data-tracking systems that monitor
Internet casino transactions make spotting and screening out of
compulsive gamblers easier than land-based casinos. 132 Essentially,
the technology creates an electronic-transfer record every time a
virtual bet is made that can be compiled to identify patterns of
addictive and compulsive behavior. 133 Unlike the land-based resorts,
which rely on the dealer or pit boss' memory, these electronic records
can be saved indefinitely. 1 34 With respect to underage online
gambling, a regulatory schema can be effective as well. For example,
organizations such as the Interactive Gaming Counsel have proposed
ideas such as creating a worldwide database that could be used to
135
identify and screen out minors.
Currently, there is very little support for an international
regulatory schema with U.S. involvement. 136 The two elements
necessary for such a schema are regulation and international
collaboration. While these two elements appear to go hand-in-hand in
creating a viable schema for addressing the policy concerns of online
gambling while still taking advantage of the revenues to be gained,
no sources strongly and simultaneously advocate both elements.
Particular commentators have supported a regulatory schema over a
prohibitive one. 137 But only one commentator espouses the virtue of
even a general international solution. In her Note, Cara Franklin
states that "[t]he Internet offers a brand new, and ever expanding
forum that has seemed to elude the government's strict
regulations.' 138
Franklin further notes that "prohibiting online
gambling outright would be much easier if this view was supported

in Antigua. The money is already here....
Antigua.

They are making a virtual visit to
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132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
note 25,
138.
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Id. at 440.
Id. at 445-47.
See, e.g., Loscalzo & Shapiro, supranote 105, at 27; see also Franklin, supra
11.
Franklin, supranote 25, 11.
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by an international coalition. Much to the dismay of American
politicians, a coalition of this sort of organization is nowhere near
fruition; in fact, many foreign countries support online gambling and
profit from its existence. ' 13 9 Surprisingly, however, while Franklin
goes on to support a regulatory schema, she never seriously contends
attempts to form that
that the United States should engage in real 140
regulatory schema in an international context.

IV. ONLINE GAMBLING AND CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SCHEMAS

A. The CaribbeanCountries
As mentioned earlier, attempts to prohibit gambling at both the
state and federal levels have led to the creation of "safe havens"locations outside the United States where Internet casino operators
base their operations 1 41 and obtain Internet gambling licenses with
minimal effort and at low cost. 14 2 Of the approximately sixty-eight
offshore Internet gambling sites in the Caribbean and Central
America, about twenty-seven are in Antigua. 143 Antigua and the
Caribbean Islands currently operate their licensing program under
the "1994 Antigua and Barbuda Free Trade and Processing Zone Area
Act."'144 Under this Act, a commission is established to create a taxfree zone for a number of industries, including gambling. 14 5 A
business only has to purchase a license from the commission in order
to benefit from the tax breaks. 146 "Antigua charges a $100,000 annual
fee for an Internet casino license and $75,000 for a sports license, and
a twenty percent tax for overseas phone bills."'1 47 "Applicants are also
subject to a background check and the government claims to have
rejected over 300 applications.' 48 Unfortunately, Antigua and other
Caribbean countries require little accountability in exchange for the
licenses. 149 In fact, many countries rely heavily on the licensing

139.
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141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
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Id. at 128.
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scheme and thus provide government protection from prosecution by

U.S. authorities.

150

Responding to concerns that Antigua was operating its licensing
programs without any form of :control, the Antiguan government
enacted regulations, such as the "Antigua and Barbuda Standard
Conditions for the Licensing of Virtual Casino Wagering" and "Sports
Book Wagering in the Antigua and- Barbuda Free Trade and
Processing Zone" that established certain restrictions specifically
prohibiting the transfer of a license to a third party and the
falsification or willful omission of any information required as a
condition for licensing. 15 1 These regulations require the testing of
software used to operate online gambling sites. 152 Nevertheless, the
general reputation that Antigua and the Caribbean in general share
as a place of loose regulation will not likely change soon. 153 For
example, even with the new restrictions in place, there have been
allegations that questionable practices still take place. 154 Recently,
Starnet Communications International, Inc., a Canadian Internet
gambling operator, allegedly made a "secret deal" with Antiguan
regulators whereby Starnet obtained fifteen Internet licensees for
$50,000 each, plus $250,000, and further orchestrated the removal of
an Antiguan commissioner of the Free Trade Zone who had been a
"hindrance" to Starnet's business. 155 A coalition of countries involved
in an international regulatory schema would need to take precautions
to crack down on safe-havens such as Antigua.
B. The Australian System
While the regulatory schemas in the Caribbean countries cater to
the casino operators, the Australian government has established a
more balanced licensing scheme for hosting Internet gambling sites
within its borders. 156 Specifically, the Australian states have chosen
to license only qualified applicants. 157 This move by the Australian
government supports the view that simple Internet banning is not
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151.
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effective. 158 Australia opted for regulation over prohibition because,
similar to the situation in the United States, online gambling was
already taking place by Australian users. 159 As one commentator has
stated, the Australian model of regulation balances different agendas
and facilitates a result in which the "companies are solvent, the
160
games are fair, and the winners can claim their loot.'
The fact that the Australian government chose a regulatory
system over a prohibition system does not mean that policy
considerations such as addiction and underage gambling were not
recognized or addressed. Specifically, the government had "grave
concerns about the potential for online gambling to exacerbate
already high levels of problem gamblers in Australia.' 1 6 1 In response,
many of Australia's regulations focus on minimizing harm to problem
gamblers while simultaneously ensuring that the industry operates
16 2
according to the Australian laws that apply to traditional casinos.
Nevertheless, the Australian government also wanted to respond to
the prolific nature of online gambling. 163 Thus, the Australian
regulatory model was the most viable policy to take. 164 The
Australian model has been characterized as providing legitimate
online gambling while "being subject to stringent regulation by
sophisticated and experienced regulatory bodies."'1 65 The result was
that in 1997, each Australian state and territory released a draft
model for regulating Internet gambling. 166 The international
community has taken note of the success and reasonableness of the
Australian system. For example, Antigua is currently in the process
of revising its International Business Corporation Act and, in doing

158.
Tratos, supra note 156, at 695 (quoting David Ford, Executive Director of
the Queensland Office of Gaming Regulation in Australia: "Australian officials
concluded that Internet gambling could not effectively be banned, and the decision to
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gambling.").
159.
Id. at 695 (quoting another Australian official indicating that banning
online gambling was not "addressing the real issues.... [P]rohibition leads to loss of
consumer and producer benefits, inefficient allocation of resources (including
enforcement) and crime and corruption.").
160.
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RED HERRING, Apr. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 22831152.
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Sept. 22,
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so, will use the Australian Queensland Interactive (Player Protection)
16 7
Act as a model.
The specifics of the Australian system demonstrate how a
regulatory schema can accomplish many of the protective measures
that a prohibition system aims to achieve while not completely
eradicating the option to gamble online. First, in the Australian
system, government officials check the software of online casinos as
they do with land-based casinos. 168 The officials investigate the
background of the virtual casino operators and do spot-checks to
verify that each casino's odds are what they are claimed to be and
that the games are not being manipulated. 169 Once the operation has
passed the regulations, Australia makes it legal for its citizens
anywhere in the world to play online, provided they have the
necessary equipment to allow downloading of some basic software
and have verified they are of legal age via a system of gatekeeping
170
measures.
As a result of the Australian model, the first licensed online
casino approved, monitored, and taxed by a developed country went
online in 2000.171 In April of that year, the Lasseters Casino in Alice
Springs, Australia was permitted to operate online gambling
operations by the Northern Territory Minister for Gaming. 172 Under
this regulatory scheme, the casino site was licensed under the
Northern Territory Gaming Control Regulations. 7 3 The casino
offered the same selection of games common to most brick-and-mortar
casinos (such as roulette, joker poker, blackjack, sicbo, and seven
different slot games with a ninety-two percent payout). 174 The result
is a casino with the functionality, control, and protection of a
standard casino and, theoretically, the advantages of time and
convenience of the Internet. In addition, online players who have
disputes with the casino have a governmental authority to whom they
can complain and in theory, have a fair adjudication of the
problem. 175 That government entity can monitor the payouts and act
as an intermediary on the player's behalf, thus serving in a similar

167.
Id. This fact shows the viability and willingness of countries to base their
systems on the Australian model. Thus, if a regulatory international model can be
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regulatory function as it has done so in the past for land-based
76
casinos.1
The Australian model serves as an excellent example of an
effective regulatory schema and, in addition, gives insight into what
an international regulatory schema should encompass. First, in the
Australian system, online casino operators are licensed by the state
and territorial governments. 177 The reason that Australian gaming
regulation has been under the province of the various Australian
state and territory governments is that the Australia Commonwealth
Constitution did not give the Commonwealth power with respect to
178
gaming.
The fact that the Australian model was territorially based gives
insight into how an international regulatory schema could
constructively operate. 179 For the purposes of this analysis, by
extrapolating each territory as if it were a country, it is useful to see
that Australia's system creates a broad regulatory schema while still
preserving the particular and individual economic policies and moral
standards of each state and territory. For example, the Australian
system has allowed each state and territory to develop a significant
(and not necessarily identical) regulatory regime and at a "high level
of expertise across a range of areas, including economic and social
policy."' 8 0
The Australian system, while generally effective, has not escaped
criticism. On August 17, 2000, in reliance on its chartered power to
legislate with respect to "postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other
like services," the Commonwealth Government introduced the
Interactive Gambling (Moratorium) Bill 2000 (hereinafter, the
Bill). ls l The Bill was created to "pause the development of the
Australian based interactive gambling industry while an
investigation into the feasibility and consequences of banning
interactive gambling is conducted."'1 2 The Bill finally passed the
House of Representatives on December 7, 2000, after intense political
lobbying by both anti-gambling establishments and land-based casino
businesses. 18 3 By that time, more than half of the moratorium period
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180.
Id.
181.
Goss, supra note 162, at *8-9 (citing AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V. § 51(v)).
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had already lapsed. 184 Nevertheless, as one author has commented,
"despite the temporary cessation of licensing as a result of the
passage of the Bill, the Australian Internet gambling industry
continues to flourish. 18 5
The Australian regulatory system has also suffered in popularity
because of attacks against its economic efficiency. As stated, the
Australian system allows its states and territories to enact their own
specific gaming regulations. 186 In some of the Australian territories,
the licensed online casino pays a tax of eight percent on its online
gambling revenue.18 7 But the regulatory schema for Victoria,
Queensland, and the Australian Capital Territory include a fifty
percent online gambling tax.188 The rationale for the fifty percent tax
is premised upon the supposed economics of Internet gambling. An
Internet gaming operator does not have to make the capital
investment in physical infrastructure that operators of land-based
casinos do. 189 For example, online gambling operations neither
employ a significant number of people nor pay substantial real
property taxes. 190 Essentially, the argument is that the fixed costs of
online gambling operations are low enough that online operators can
afford to pay the tax. While this contention may be true, a high tax
rate and accompanying regulation by the Australian government can
at times strongly discourage online gambling ventures from being
established. 191 This criticism of the Australian model could also be an
attack on an international regulatory schema modeled after the
Australian system. If different countries tax the casino servers that
are housed in their countries at significantly different rates, then
these discrepancies could lead online gambling companies to relocate
to where they are taxed the least. If the countries with the lowest tax
rates also happen to be the countries with the weakest regulatory
policies, then the result of such an international schema would not be
much different from the situation as it stands today. Therefore, while
the Australian model is a good example of how to enact an
international regulatory schema while still preserving the individual
positions of particular countries, it is evident that there would need to
be cooperation among the countries involved in determining (1) a
range of regulatory policies not so diverse so as to create the safe-
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havens that currently exist in Antigua and the Caribbean and (2)
comparable tax structures so that companies choose not to relocate
based on the fixed costs of operations.
C. The European Union
The European Union (EU) offers another model of regulation
that could possibly serve as a template for an international
regulatory schema. Gambling is regulated at the national level by all
EU Member States in the absence of EU legislation. 19 2 In order to
control and limit the supply of gambling in their territories and to
ensure that the revenue of gambling is to a certain extent used for
public benefit, all Member States have imposed limitations on crossborder gambling activities. 193 One important feature of the EU
system is that Member States have the right to prohibit or restrict
games offered from other EU jurisdictions, even if they are provided
by means of the Internet. 9 4 The Scandinavian countries apply the
most stringent regulatory standards to gambling services, where only
state-controlled operators are competent to offer games of chance. 19 5
The European Commission is currently reconsidering whether,
and under what form, it should regulate online gambling as a
collective entity. 19 6 The EU may address this issue in three forms.
First, the EU may pass legislation covering all types of gambling
services. 197 Second, the Commission may decide to deal with some
issues (for example, betting), while leaving others to national law (for
example, casinos and lotteries). 198 Third, the Commission may not act
at all. 199
If the Commission decides to regulate gambling services, it has
20 0
two options for doing so: mutual recognition or harmonization.
Under mutual recognition, a gaming operator complying with the
requirements of his country of origin has the right to provide his
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See Philippe Vlaemminck & Pieter De Wael, The European Union
Regulatory Approach of Online Gambling and Its Impact on the Global Gaming
Industry, 7 GAMING L. REV. 177, 177 (June 2003).
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Id.; see also Cowan, supra note 4, at 255-58 (discussing Great Britain
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adopt legislation regulating Internet gambling sites).
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services in all the other EU Member States. 20 1 Mutual recognition
would make it possible for U.K. gaming operators to offer their
services on a pan-European scale. 20 2 An important fundamental
distinction between these two options is that under harmonization,
all different national rules are replaced by a single set of universal
rules, while mutual recognition is more of a standard international
20 3
comity arrangement.
Based on the nature of online gaming operations, the
Commission, sensibly, would like to propose legislation grounded on a
harmonization theory. 20 4 But the Commission realizes that
harmonization would not be easy, as it would require a political
consensus on a uniform set of gambling laws. 20 5 Realistically, the
Commission understands that a single government or law cannot
control the Internet. 20 6 The Commission has also called for
"international treaties to create worldwide law enforcement
structures for the Internet. ''20 7 The European Counsel has also
considered the viability of an international regulatory schema similar
to the schema proposed in this paper. While the Commission seems to
support the idea in theory, it was skeptical of the ability to implement
20 8
such a schema.
Many of these concerns were addressed in 1998 by the Gaming
Regulators European Forum (hereinafter, the Forum). The Forum
advocated for an approach lying somewhere between prohibition and
regulation. 20 9 At its May 1998 meeting in Helsinki, the Forum
concluded that Internet gambling regulation must reside under the
purview of country sovereignty and that "such decisions should be
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respected by other jurisdictions. '210 The Forum went on to further
suggest that the regulatory schema that the EU employs should be
based on mutual recognition. 211 Specifically, it stated that "the
gambling so offered should be restricted to residents of the
jurisdiction concerned and residents of such other jurisdictions with
whom there are cooperative or reciprocal arrangements. '2 12 The
Forum also was concerned with the policy problems faced by users, as
discussed earlier. 213 It specifically suggested measures to protect
compulsive gamblers, the integrity of the games, player
214
confidentiality, and to prevent of money laundering.
D. Examples from Other Nations
Belize was the first nation to pass legislation providing for the
regulation of Internet gambling operations. 215 The Belize government
passed the Computer Wagering Act of 1995, which was intended to
regulate the online gambling industry. 2 16 The Wagering Act creates a
Computer Wagering Licensing Board whose members are appointed
by the government. 21 7 The Board members supervise the industry
and protect the interests of those who gamble on online casinos whose
servers are located in Belize.21 8 One regulation requires that
operators must post bonds and acquire an Internet gaming license if
they wish to set up servers in Belize. 219 The Belize government
believes that these stringent regulations actually can boost online
gambling revenues by establishing confidence in the system and
consequently attracting more Internet gambling operators and
220
patrons.
Another approach worthy of consideration is the Liechtenstein
model. The Liechtenstein model is a quasi-government-operated
Internet facility that has revenue of at least $50 million a year. 221
Recently, the Red Cross contracted with the country for a worldwide
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lottery called "Millions 2000. ,,222 The goal of the venture is to create
an international lottery on the Internet to raise money for victims of
war and disaster. 223 The site has five different games for users to
play. 224 The jackpot is normally around one million dollars each week
with an average of five million tickets each week. 225 The Secretary of
the International Red Cross, in supporting the project, stated that
"[w]e cannot fight tomorrow's battle with yesterday's weapons ...
This means that we have to steer beyond the traditional fundraising
mechanics and develop alternatives, which appeal to a global
audience."2 26 The rest of the proceeds pay operating costs and the
weekly winners and are donated to Liechtenstein charities. 227 If all
online gaming operations were run with such altruistic goals, forming
an international coalition to support a broad regulatory schema
would be much easier. 228 As an example of the lack of progressive
thinking on the matter of regulatory schemas, the American Red
Cross decided not to participate in these lotteries because "they are
not consistent with our traditional broad based fund raising
appeals." 229 Once again, this shows a lack of perspective. It is evident
in this case that a regulatory policy can further policy objectives more
successfully than an outright ban or prohibition.
E. World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization also offers a possible starting
point for creating an international schema. Within the scope of the
World Trade Organization, online gambling has not been regarded as
a particularly pressing issue. 230 But countries are beginning to use
the WTO as a forum for online gambling disputes. For example, on
March 13, 2003, Antigua and Barbuda complained to the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body that U.S. restrictions on the cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services are not compatible with WTO
law, and they requested that the WTO Settlement Dispute Body
consult with the United States on the matter. 231 Thus, the WTO
would seem to be a useful institution for developing either a
regulatory or prohibition scheme.
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V. CRITERIA OF THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY SCHEMA

Based on the different perspectives identified, it is evident that
certain criteria are essential to an international regulatory schema.
The Australian model illustrates that an international regulatory
schema must include the flexibility to allow individual countries to
23 2
choose the number of operational licenses they would grant.
Without this flexibility and autonomy, countries would likely be
unwilling to submit to regulations and to a "Code of Conduct" that
would require them to vouch for integrity, suitability, and solvency of
their country's gaming operations. 23 3 Nevertheless, one author has
suggested that there must be a base level of regulations in every
country that would "prohibit utilization of facilities by minors and the
extension of credit, mandate self-exclusion for problem gamblers,
protect players' privacy, require disclosure of slot machine payouts,
and mandate that operators submit to audits and inspection. '23 4 The
Australian model, however, serves as an example that it is possible to
tailor the particulars of online gambling regulations while still
preserving the international schema if mutual recognition among the
23 5
particular nations is achieved.
This concept is exemplified in the Queensland Interactive
Gambling (Player Protection) Act, which was passed on October 1,
1988.236 For example, the Queensland Act provides the following:
(1) a regulatory framework for the conduct of interactive gambling; (2)
licenses to be issued to approved providers of interactive gambling
activities; (3) mutual recognition of licensed providers from other
jurisdictions within Queensland and vice versa; (4) taxes to be levied on
licensed providers; and most significantly (5) a detailed regime for the
protection of people who participate in interactive gambling and the
237
community generally. [Emphasis added.]

The Queensland model also addresses the policy considerations
discussed earlier in this Note. 238 The model taxes online gamblers
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locally if Internet gaming is legal where the gambler resides, thereby
creating large incentives for each territory to regulate and control
illegality in player use. 23 9 The Queensland's Player Protection Act
also mandates the availability of a "Personal History and Suitability
of Person Proforma" form. 240 The form says that online players may
exclude themselves and "if the player is concerned about . . .another

player's welfare and believes that the gambling habit poses a threat
to the player or the player's family, an application may be made to
have the player banned from participating in any form of licensed
'241
interactive gaming activity."
To further protect children and problem gamblers, the regulatory
system should require that online casinos register their sites with a
governing agency. 242 The registration system should include all
pertinent personal identification information from users.2 4 3 In
addition, a system of verification must then be put into place to
ensure that the information received by the casino is valid and
accurate. 244 This type of regulation-aside from protecting problem
gamblers and children-will also allow participating casinos to
confirm whether there are any interstate commerce issues because
the casinos will easily be able to establish the location of each
player. 245 Finally, this regulation system likely could be effective in
24 6
preventing money laundering through off-shore channels.
Another aspect of the Queensland Act that may translate well
into an international schema is the mutual recognition system. While
it would be ideal for a regulatory schema to require a harmonization
for its participating members, such a requirement likely would be
detrimental.2 47 As stated, the EU has faced difficulty implementing
this consideration. For an international regulatory scheme to stand a
genuine chance of being approved by a large number of countries,
mutual recognition must be used to grant each country the flexibility
to adjust online gambling legislation to reflect its own view, from an
economic and a cultural standpoint, of online gambling. Of course,
mutual recognition, left unchecked, has the potential to make an
international regulatory schema ineffective and pointless because it
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would only take one country to relax its regulation in search of
increased gain to undermine the entire system. Thus, this Note's
proposed schema is workable only if there is legitimate goodwill
between the participating countries. To that point, this Note further
proposes that the WTO, discussed earlier, be the hub and negotiating
nexus through which various countries can align their legislative
policies to the degree that any remaining differences do not render
the regulatory schema ineffective.

VI. JURISDICTIONAL CONCERNS INVOLVED WITH INTERNATIONAL
SCHEMAS

While jurisdictional issues are beyond the scope of this Note,
their relevance and importance cannot be overlooked in the
implementation of a regulatory international schema. While this Note
supports the use of an international regulatory schema, the ability of
the United States to have jurisdiction over gambling operators
located outside its borders would enhance the model's effectiveness
and would further increase the chance of congressional approved of
such a model. One line of commentary suggests that the United
States can obtain personal jurisdiction over foreign-based, foreignowned virtual casinos under a conventional analysis of personal
jurisdiction. 248 Conversely, other commentary has concluded that the
United States could not obtain jurisdiction over foreign operators of
virtual casinos. 249 In espousing his support for domestic prohibition,
Senator Kyl, not surprisingly, stated that it "would be a very difficult
kind of activity to regulate because we don't have jurisdiction over the
people abroad who are doing it."' 250 In conclusion, although the
jurisdictional issue has not been addressed at length, that fact must
change before an effective regulatory schema, or even a prohibitive
one, is implemented.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Like many areas involving the Internet, online gambling
continues to expand. This growth has created new legal issues, and
many of the specifics involved with online gambling's legitimacy and
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legality reside in a quagmire of uncertainty. 25 1 One academic has
stated that "[c]onflict and confusion are the order of the day" with
respect to the regulation of online gambling. 252 This Note has
articulated that an effective regulatory international schema is more
likely to help control underage and abusive gambling, as well as
address other societal concerns, than domestic prohibition legislation
can. In addition, it would be disingenuous not to note that countries
that have established legitimate regulatory licensing schemas have
brought in significant tax revenues in the process. 253 For this
international regulatory schema to be effective, participating
countries must create a strong international coalition in order to
prevent virtual casinos from simply relocating their servers to places
outside the enforcement net.
A viable international regulatory schema can be one patterned
after Australia's
Queensland
Interactive
Gambling
(Player
Protection) Act. The Queensland model addresses many of the issues
an international regulatory schema would deal with and offers key
insight into what types of problems the model would face. One of the
greatest "balancing acts" that an international schema would have to
undertake would be to allow each country to retain its sovereign right
to decide its own online gambling position while creating enough
uniformity in the system so as to legitimately create a valid
enforcement net. For an international schema to have any chance of
being sustained, it would likely operate under a policy of mutual
recognition rather than harmonization. Such a compromise would
require participating countries to extend a measure of goodwill
toward each other. The result of a successful international regulatory
schema would be a win-win situation: users who wish to gamble
online could do so without harm, and participating countries would be
able to earn significant tax revenue in the process. Online gambling,
if regulated and properly legislated, can be a great instrument for
entertainment and commerce, a situation in which everyone involved
ends up with a winning hand.
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